

Recreating a Nation State: Postwar Austria and the French Allied Contribution

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French foreign policy was undoubtedly conceived and determined by Charles de Gaulle, President of the provisional French Government until January 1946; it was during his presidency that the first fundamental decisions concerning French Austrian policy were made. The basic decision of 1944/45 to participate in the occupation and interallied administration of Austria was made--prestige apart--to secure a French hand in Austrian affairs, to check the influence of other powers in European affairs and to make sure that French ideas concerning the fate of Austria would be heeded. The fact that France took part in the liberation and occupation of Austria was part of de Gaulle's policy of 'returning to the ranks' of the big powers.⁽¹⁾

French public opinion was infinitely more interested in the fate of Germany; the occupation of the Tyrol and Vorarlberg and the establishment of a French zone in western Austria seemed nothing more than "one of the accidental mishaps of war and did not interest the French people at all".⁽²⁾ But this lack of public interest was compensated for by General de Gaulle's very clear ideas, which were apparently shared by French diplomats and the Military Government set up in Austria in the summer of 1945. The question of why the French should be present in Austria is answered in the following terms:⁽³⁾

France owes it to herself to save face and prove that the fate of Europe cannot be decided without us.

But--as an Austrian observer put it--"France was poor and weak, poorer and weaker than she had ever been before, materially and morally . . ."⁽⁴⁾ What political gains could France

expect from her involvement with Austria? In other words, what policy did Paris try to pursue in Austria?

The basic ideas were to reestablish a sovereign Austria and to aid in the recovery of the country. The French *Directives pour notre action en Autriche*, of July 19th, 1945, are quite clear. To quote point 1:⁽⁵⁾

The basic aim of our policy is the creation of an independent and economically viable Austria, completely detached from Germany.

Austria, reestablished as a free, independent and economically revitalized state, was above all to be strengthened against any possible foreign hegemony. Germany was and remained the central focus of French foreign policy--even with regard to Austria. The power of the German Reich had just been crushed; the Reich had ceased to exist; Austria had been liberated and constituted as a free country. Still, France had learned through history that every time Germany had managed to dominate Austria, it had sooner or later led to a catastrophe for France. As General Béthouart, the French Commander-in-Chief in Austria, put it:

Let's not forget that Sadova [Königgrätz, 1866] preceded Sedan, just like the Anschluss preceded 1940.⁽⁶⁾

This kind of outcome was to be made impossible once and for all. Austria should never again be tempted to align itself with Germany. My paper will therefore focus upon French plans to cut the structural, personal, economic and psychological links that had bound Austria to Germany. In this context French policy had three aims: deannexation, denazification and deintoxication.

Deannexation

The French information services in their zone had received orders to combat the idea of "pan-Germanism," the idea that people speaking the German language should live in the same state. Austrians were to learn to cherish everything that was specifically Austrian--in contrast to things typically German. They were to be shown how "the National-Socialist doctrines had perverted the Austrian soul, lowered the intellectual level and led to the ruin of Austria."⁽⁷⁾ They were to be given tangible examples of crimes to which the "logic" of Nazi *Weltanschauung* had led. This propagandistic line was the pervasive theme of many exhibitions shown in the French zone, documentary movies (e.g. *Les camps de la mort*), and press and radio features that allowed victims of the Nazi regime and ex-prisoners of concentration camps to relate their horrible experiences to a broad public.

This ideological effort was to be backed up by a practical measure directed against individuals: the expulsion of German citizens, which was also considered part of the deannexation plan, like closing a chapter of the past. The Military Government's order to

repatriate Germans living in Austria seems to have been very popular with the local population. A report dated May 1945 states: "The entire population demands the immediate expulsion of the Germans."⁽⁸⁾

The first reason for this demand was pragmatic. At a time when the daily food rations had fallen to a level of about 1,200 calories a day--far below the official minimum rate--every additional mouth to feed was a burden. In fact, right after the liberation, there were between 45,000 and 50,000 Germans living in the French zone, which amounted to about 9 to 10 percent of the population. During the first year after the liberation, more than 30,000 Germans had to leave the French zone in Austria.

A second motive for the Austrian demands--which in this case was parallel to French intentions--was the new self image the Austrians were beginning to give themselves. It went like this: the Germans, not Austrians, are the Nazis and only the Nazis are responsible for the war and its heinous crimes.

Forced repatriation started early--in May/June 1945--and was hindered only by the fact that the Military Governments in Germany were usually only willing to accept additional persons (i.e. "mouths to feed") if they could send back Austrians living in Germany, a deal that amounted to barter trade!

The only provision with which the Austrians strongly disagreed was that the Germans were allowed to carry no more than 30 kg of personal belongings with them. Austrian politicians and dignitaries intervened with the Military Government, stating that the reputation of the occupation power might suffer because people tended to consider this provision unjust. The answer of Pierre Voizard, the head of the French Military Government is very instructive, as it shows the French aims very clearly:

I am indeed very much surprised to see a high Austrian official make German interests his own and thus prove that close ties of obligations and solidarity continue to exist. [. . .] We have wished to end the solidarity between the Austrians and the Germans.⁽⁹⁾

Of course not all Germans had to leave the country: those who had already been living there before the Anschluss of 1938 were allowed to stay, provided they had not been "Nazis, antisocial or acting contrary to the interests of this country."⁽¹⁰⁾ As time went by, Austrian and French authorities became more and more liberal, conceding exemptions and granting residence permits.

What was also important was the psychological "deannexation," implicit in the repatriation of Austrian POWs. By May of 1944, Austrians within the territories under the control of de Gaulle's Free French Committee (*Comité Français de la Libération Nationale*) were no longer registered as "ex-Austrians" or, worse, "German refugees." Now they were officially "Austrians," and as such were included in the list of "non-enemies." Austrian prisoners of war in Wehrmacht uniforms especially profited from this policy: all Austrian POWs who wished to be separated from German Wehrmacht soldiers were to be assembled in separate camps or at least their own compounds. The release and

repatriation of Austrian POWs started very soon after the end of the hostilities: prisoners who had been caught on Austrian territory were released in the summer of 1945, and the repatriation of those imprisoned in France or in the French *départements* in North Africa started that November.⁽¹¹⁾ French propaganda (Radio Paris) insisted that

the recognition of Austria as a free and independent state [October 1945] also frees her prisoners, who were drawn into the German catastrophe as soldiers of the German Wehrmacht. It was the German uniform which held them in captivity well beyond the existence of the German Reich.

This sort of argument constitutes just one more psychological element in what might be described as a policy whose goal was the total and complete severing of links with Germany.

Denazification

If Austria was to become a stable and democratic country, denazification was crucial to the outcome of the "experiment." Moreover, the French considered denazification and demilitarisation in Austria a step toward European security. Public declarations of the French Commander-in-Chief stressed that the Military Government would "reintroduce the liberties for which the Allied powers had fought," "liquidate everything reminiscent of the National-Socialist tyranny" and "persecute with great energy and punish those who would not break with a regime based on hate and tyranny."⁽¹²⁾ But because there were no clearly defined political guidelines, no directives on how to administer denazification and a shortage of material means and personnel to implement the declarations, the French had to improvise.

The first 'mop up' in the French zone was handled in accordance with the American "Provisional Handbook for Military Government in Austria": all important Nazis were to be interned or imprisoned. This applied especially to members of the SS, officers of the SA, "Illegals" (members of the NSDAP or their organizations in the period between July 1st, 1933 and March 13th, 1938, the Anschluss) as well as high ranking members of the Nazi Party.

Tyrol had been occupied by American troops in May 1945 and was administrated by American military governments until July 10th, when the French incorporated it into their occupation zone in accordance with the decision of the four-power European Advisory Commission. The American authorities in Tyrol had also arrested former officials of the Corporate State, members of the *Heimwehr* and the Fatherland Front, as ordered in the handbook. The Americans got a "history lesson" from Tyrol's conservative provincial governor, Karl Gruber, who told them: "You cannot build a democracy just with socialists."⁽¹³⁾ This actually led to a reinterpretation of the guidelines by American officials. Gruber's point was underscored by the results of the provincial elections of November 1945: 28 percent of the electorate voted for the socialists and 2 percent for the

Communist Party, while the vast majority cast their ballots for the conservative Peoples Party.

The transfer of the occupation administration in Tyrol from American to French hands did not facilitate a consistent denazification procedure. The new French Military Government stated:⁽¹⁴⁾

The Americans, who were quick to leave--sometimes with all the documentation they had secured--left us two empty offices, files without value and an empty report. Some of them had told the people we were incompetent, loiterers and criminals . . .

They also left behind about 3,000 persons in internment camps and prisons, and nobody knew who had imprisoned them, or why. By September 1945, the French had arrested 3,000 more people, so together with those caught by American forces, about 6,000 persons were in prisons or camps.

Prisoners in jail could hope for a trial that would convict or acquit them. Internment, however, was a precautionary step, a military action, and internees were somewhat comparable to POWs. Internment solely on the grounds of having held a rank in the Nazi hierarchy often lasted for many months and even up to more than a year without any formal statement of charges. Austrian citizens--and not only Nazi sympathizers--protested that the internments contradicted the new democratic order, and that many of the internees had not committed any crimes, as the occupation powers very well knew. Furthermore, the fact that low-ranking, possibly repentant Nazis were arbitrarily put together with "big fish" for a long period of time was certainly counterproductive. This has proved especially true of *Glaserbach*, the large American camp near Salzburg. In this respect French and American practices were the same.

But material problems and shortage of personnel made things very difficult for the French. In October 1945, they created a commission that was to determine if internment could be justified in each and every case. In the first month, they tried to review some 340 cases (out of 6,000) and released 18 persons, but in almost 200 of these 340 cases no decision could be reached because of lack of information. Cases decided in one month amounted to only about 2 percent of the inmates. It was an extremely tiresome process.

Austrian authorities were very unhappy with these problems; all the more so because the political and administrative powers in questions of denazification had been handed over to them. The Austrian government in Vienna, in the center of the Soviet zone, had enacted the two fundamental laws for denazification: the Interdiction law (*Verbotsgesetz*) on May 8th and the War Criminal Law (*Kriegsverbrechergesetz*) on June 26, 1945. Since the western powers had not recognized the Renner Government for fear it was or would become a Soviet puppet, these laws did not automatically apply in the western zones. But in October 1945, the Renner Government was allowed to extend its authority over the entire Austrian territory, which amounted to defacto recognition. In November 1945, the Allied Council finally approved the interdiction and the war criminal laws, so they could

be enforced in all four zones. From then on, denazification was handled by the Austrian authorities under the supreme control of the Allied Council.

But Military Government internment camps continued to exist; only in August 1946 did the French start to abolish them. At that time they still held 2,500 people who had been interned without trial. Camps were closed by the end of the year and the internees were either released or handed over to the prosecution.

The 6,000 people who had been interned accounted for 14 percent of all registered National Socialists. By September 1946, almost 50 percent of these internees (2,900 cases) had been reported to the prosecution. The French zone was second only to the American in the number of internments per registered Nazi and in the number of reports to the prosecution. French policy was by no means lax, as some historians have wrongly concluded.⁽¹⁵⁾

Internments had been made according to handbook regulations and the personal judgments of Allied officers and local authorities. The primary goal was to put away people who were considered dangerous as well as the most important representatives of the Nazi regime, who were often only judged by their rank or function. Only in a second, more orderly action did the new authorities try to register all party members and Nazi sympathizers. Three organizations worked on that, each independently of the others. The resistance movement set up a card index (based on internal Nazi documentation), like the Americans the French occupation power worked with questionnaires, and the Austrian interdiction law prescribed that the National Socialists be registered in a public procedure.

At the same time, purges of various professional groups were started. A special and very sensitive group was the public sector. In coordination with the French Military Government the provincial government had created special commissions in all branches of the public sector, including schools, police departments, and the legal system. A representative of the provincial government, three party officials (one for each party, the ÖVP, SPÖ and KPÖ) and a member of the resistance movement met to decide the fate of public officers, clerks and employees. An observer from the Military Government was also present, and all decisions of this board became effective only after approval by the French Military Government. This system remained in effect until November 1945. After the Austrians took over the main responsibility for denazification, French representatives no longer sat on the board.

By September 1946 these special commissions had purged 25 percent of the civil servants: 3,400 people had been ousted, 100 retired, and 1,300 suspended from office. Almost half of the 14,500 people left in office fell under the registration law because they had been members of the Nazi party or had tried to join it. Slowly their cases were studied and decided on, but still in 1947 one out of three civil servants in office had once been members of the NSDAP. In 1948, the figures dropped to one out of four.

The French adapted much more to local necessities than the other powers. They relied on the newly established provincial governments and believed that they generally could be trusted. As early as the summer of 1945, the first commissions had been established and the French had limited themselves to sending an observer. The decisions had to be authorized by the Military Government, but in general it seems that the occupation power upheld the initial judgments. Local authorities and the occupation power seem to have had the same general ideas about denazification. In this phase it was quite drastic and a statistical comparison with the other zones shows that the French zone was second only to the American zone.

One consideration, though, has to be taken into account: in the end, the aim of denazification was to create a stable and economically viable Austria. In a situation where a vast majority of Austrians did not believe that the young republic would survive for long economically, it would have been ill-advised to make mass arrests of people in the business world and risk ruining enterprises. This policy, of course, favored the "illegals," those who had financed the Nazi party before the Anschluss, the Aryanzers and war profiteers.

The attitude of the occupation power was very clearly expressed by the French Commander-in-Chief and High Commissioner, General Marie-Emile Béthouart, in a speech at the *Ecole des Sciences Politiques* in Paris, on July, 1946:

What remains is the private sector, which is obviously the most delicate one and where the purges have been limited to the most outrageous cases in order not to paralyze the economic activity of the country.⁽¹⁶⁾

French policy in this sector was indeed very pragmatic, but the local authorities viewed the problems in much the same way. Again, there seems to have been a tacit agreement between the occupier and the local elite.

Deintoxication: French Cultural Activities

Administrative and legal purges (denazification) were meant from the very beginning to be backed up by a cultural, psychological, and spiritual "deintoxication." This was an important fundamental aim of French cultural activities. As General Béthouart, the great mentor of all cultural activities of the French, put it:

Denazification therefore must not only consist of chasing the Nazis from their posts in the administration, the economic, social or cultural life of this country and in punishing the very guilty ones, but--even more--of eliminating from their heads the smallest remnant of this latent pan-Germanism, National-Socialism being but the latest variety of this [sic !].⁽¹⁷⁾

In contrast to their policy and procedures in Germany, the French did not want to impose any form of forced "re-education" in Austria. French officials apparently considered

Austrians capable of finding their own "Austrian" way--as opposed to the "German" way--without outside help. This approach possibly hid a certain amount of uncertainty about how to deal with the Austrians, but it also demonstrated a considerable degree of trust. The French preferred to suggest, propose, and encourage:

Since we do not have an Austrian doctrine to present to the Austrians, we can only give them some fundamental ideas based on which the Austrian people will start their search according to their own character and deep longings.⁽¹⁸⁾

While these directives expressed the spirit of the French cultural policy in Austria, they lacked the "*pharisaïsme de la rééducation*" (Alfred Grosser), that air of superiority which was so manifest in French policy toward Germany. In the case of Austria, the French wanted to present their achievements and open up a window to the world (especially the francophone world) in a country long cut off from international scientific, artistic and other developments. Yet the Austrians were to be regarded as partners who would start to renew their own cultural traditions. General Béthouart had this view of the "ultimate aims" of his policy:

In order to make the reconciliation between the French and the Austrians definite, we had to forge lasting human relations between our two states, relations which went far beyond the requirements of politics or of the occupation, which was limited in time . . .⁽¹⁹⁾

French cultural activities also tried to create an image of Austria that would help Austrians rediscover their own unique cultural identity--all under the heading of mental "deannexation."

What image of Austria did the French occupation power try to promote? According to an analysis by Michel Cullin,⁽²⁰⁾ it was especially the image of "catholic and baroque Austria with conservative traditions, in a word: Habsburg Austria."⁽²¹⁾ There were probably several reasons for this. First, it seems to have coincided with the popular image the French had of Austria. Second, the historical affinities between "catholic Austria" and "catholic France" might have been closer than those between the "proletarian" sectors of these countries, and as a result influenced their mutual perception. And third, in the interwar period the notion of "Austrian identity" had suffered some very strange distortions, e.g., the notion of the Austrians as the "better Germans," which were hard for the French public to understand. The majority of the Austrians themselves preferred to look back upon a period that was generally regarded as a positive and grand part of Austrian history rather than to acknowledge the bitter historical failure of the First Republic. The editorial of the French-Austrian periodical *Wort und Tat* (Nr. 1, August 1946) shows this attitude quite clearly:

Austria has not only to work--as do other peoples today--in order to establish new international relations, Austria has to do more: she has to find herself, she has to give the disfigured and slandered Austrian identity new prestige by resuming her secular traditions of humanity. At the crossroad between east and west, between northern and

southern Europe, Austria has to become once again the focal point of the economic and cultural sphere.

Allowing Austrians their "cultural autonomy" therefore meant restoring traditional values. This was obvious at least in the French zone (Tyrol and Vorarlberg) where the conservative Peoples Party (ÖVP) held more than two thirds of the votes in 1945. But this recourse to old traditions was problematic for the French, especially in Tyrol, where tradition includes the veneration of the local hero, Andreas Hofer.

Hofer, an inn-keeper, had led a popular uprising against foreign occupation in 1809 (the Tyrolean peasants had had the right to bear arms) and had commanded victorious battles against Bavarian troops and Napoleonic generals. One year later he was betrayed, captured and shot by the French. The Tyrolean "Schützen" (a sort of alpine group of minutemen that was still a strong and important association after World War II) perpetuated this pillar of Tyrolean ideology, which was clearly directed against the French.

The French Commander-in-Chief notes in his memoirs that on the day of his ceremonious arrival in Innsbruck, the monument to Andreas Hofer was draped in black,⁽²²⁾ and the French intelligence service pointed out that prevailing attitudes towards the occupation power were influenced by this anti-French tradition. The French thus had to devise a very clever policy in order to avoid conflict. General Béthouart soon gave the "Schützen" the right to bear arms again--a special sign of trust towards the Tyroleans at a time when the Allied Council in Vienna had ordered the complete disarmament of Austria--and he cultivated close contacts with their organization. His confirmation of Hofer's authenticity as a historical figure was followed by a masterpiece of historical revisionism that presented Andreas Hofer in "his role as a Tyrolean patriot, who fought for the freedom of his country, just like the French resistance fighters rose up against Nazi oppression."⁽²³⁾

With this policy the French managed to dispel reservations based on traditional attitudes and to change the "climate" in favor of the occupation power. In addition, it created a positive attitude toward General Béthouart.

It was in fact Béthouart who shaped the French cultural policy in Austria and especially insisted on programs for the young. The Nazis had had eight years to indoctrinate the younger generation with their ideology; young Austrians had been schooled and trained in their ideas and organized in their paramilitary organizations. The French made a special point of contributing to the "political, spiritual and moral deintoxication of the Austrian youth":⁽²⁴⁾

The youth, which will form the cadres of the future, has been decimated in the ranks of the Wehrmacht. Those who survived or those who were too young to fight have had eight years of Nazi drill.

For them we have to make every effort in order to get fresh air in and give them back their enthusiasm for generous ideas, for freedom and for initiatives--this will be the best antidote against pan-Germanist and Nazi doctrines of death and racism.

The French tried to lead Austria's youth in new directions. International youth camps (with 20,000 participants alone in the summer of 1946!), student exchanges, scholarships, conferences by famous artists, philosophers and professionals were to achieve a certain cultural standing of "la grande nation" with the future élites of this small republic.

The French invested considerable manpower and material in order to turn their zone and especially Vienna into a base for their "expansion culturelle." The early establishment of Instituts français in Innsbruck (Summer of 1946) and Vienna (1947) as well as many other cultural activities from 1945 on illustrate this effort.

Having analyzed some of the main characteristics of the French policy in Austria we can conclude that all the actions taken by the High Commissioner or the Military Government--be they discriminatory (freeing of Austrian POWs vs. expulsion of German citizens), punitive (denazification) or positive (propaganda and cultural activities)--were tuned to one aim: to support and to help the reestablishment of a free, independent, self-assured and prosperous state in the heart of Europe.

Endnotes

1. Cf. Klaus Eisterer, Conception de l'Autriche et politique autrichienne de De Gaulle entre 1943 et 1946, in: *Espoir. Revue de l'Institut Charles de Gaulle*, Nr. 82 (1992), p. 4-11; German version: De Gaulle und Österreich 1938-1946, in: *De Gaulles europäische Gröe: Analysen aus Österreich (= Jahrbuch für Zeitgeschichte 1990/91)*, p. 3-16.

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2. Georges Castellan, Österreich als Faktor in der französischen Nachkriegspolitik--ein Kommentar, in: Günter Bischof / Josef Leidenfrost (Eds.), *Die bevormundete Nation. Österreich und die Alliierten 1945-1949*. (Innsbrucker Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte 4), Innsbruck 1988, pp. 293-300, 296.

3. Commandement en Chef français en Autriche (Ed.), *Le problème autrichien actuel. Pourquoi la France est-elle en Autriche?* (1945).

4. Letter Margulies to Norbert Bischoff, 22. 10. 1945. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Bundeskanzleramt - Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Sekt. II Pol./1945, Karton 8.

5. Issued by the Gouvernement provisoire de la République Française, Présidence du Gouvernement, Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministeriel des Affaires allemandes et

autrichiennes. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Archives diplomatiques, Paris: Série Z, Europe 1945-1949, Sous-série Autriche, [quoted as MAE/Z] volume 8, fol. 104-106.

6. "*Les problèmes autrichiens d'après-guerre*", text of speech made by General Béthouart in Paris on June, 20th, 1946. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Bundeskanzleramt--Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Sekt. II Pol./1946, Karton 5.

7. Commandement en Chef Français en Autriche, Cabinet Civil: Directives pour la propagande, 15. 9. 1945. Archives de l'Occupation française en Allemagne et Autriche, Colmar: Archives du Haut Commissariat français en Autriche, [quoted MAE/C], caisse 1382, p. 36, d. 6.

8. Autriche, renseignements divers, [11. 5. 1945]. MAE/Z 94, fol. 250.

9. Voizard to Ulrich Ilg, Landeshauptmann of Vorarlberg, 10. 9. 1945. Vorarlberger Landesarchiv, Bregenz, Prs. 80/1947.

10. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Bregenz to all mayors of the district, 18. 8. 1945. Vorarlberger Landesarchiv, Bregenz, Prs. 80/1947.

11. Cf. Klaus Eisterer, Die österreichischen Kriegsgefangenen in Frankreich und die Rolle der Schweiz bei ihrer Repatriierung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: *Historische Blickpunkte. Festschrift für Johann Rainer* (Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft 25), Innsbruck 1988, p. 79-95; Klaus Eisterer, Heimkehr aus der Kriegsgefangenschaft, in: *Tiroler Heimat* 57 (1993), p. 271-283.

12. Béthouart, "An die Bevölkerung von Tirol und Vorarlberg," in: *Tiroler Amtsblatt* 1945, p. 2 f.

13. Karl Gruber, Ein politisches Leben. Österreichs Weg zwischen den Diktaturen, Wien--München--Zürich 1976, p. 51.

14. Military Government Tyrol, Résumé de l'activité du Gouvernement Militaire du Tyrol depuis sa création jusqu'au 15 décembre 1945, 19. 12. 1945. MAE/C, C. 1415, p. 1.

15. See e. g. Dieter Stiefel, Entnazifizierung in Österreich, Wien--München--Zürich 1981.

16. Béthouart: "*Les problèmes autrichiens d'après guerre*".

17. Cf. Bulletin d'Activité, ed. by. Commandement en Chef Français en Autriche (Feb./March 1946), p. 3.

18. Commandement en Chef Français en Autriche, Cabinet Civil: Directives pour la propagande, 15. 9. 1945. MAE/C, C. 1382, p. 36, d. 6.

19. Marie-Emile Béthouart, *Die Schlacht um Österreich*, Wien 1967, p. 15.
20. Cullin was director of the French cultural Institute in Vienna from 1982-1986.
21. Michel Cullin, *L'action culturelle française en Autriche après 1945*, in: *Austriaca. Cahiers universitaires d'information sur l'Autriche. Spécial colloque: Relations franco-autrichiennes 1870-1970*, Rouen 1986, p. 321-329, 322.
22. Béthouart, *Schlacht*, S. 41.
23. Cf. Cullin, *L'action culturelle*, S. 324, who analyzes the officially inspired French publications on this subject, especially Raoul de Broglie, *Souvenirs français dans le Tyrol*, Innsbruck 1949.
24. Eugène Susini to Béthouart, 13. 12. 1946. MAE/C, C. 2357, p. 84/85, d. 84/85.